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Abstract 
When a group engages in immoral behavior, group members face the whistleblowerÕs 
dilemma:  the conflict between remaining loyal to the group and standing up for other 
moral concerns.  This study examines the developmental origins of this dilemma by 
investigating 5-year-oldsÕ whistleblowing on their in- vs. outgroup membersÕ moral 
transgression.  Children (n=96) watched puppets representing their ingroup vs. 
outgroup members commit either a mild or a severe transgression.  After the mild 
transgression, children tattled on both groups equally often.  After the severe 
transgression, however, they were significantly less likely to blow the whistle on their 
ingroup than on the outgroup.  These results suggest that children have a strong 
tendency to act on their moral concerns, but can adjust their behavior according to 
their groupÕs need:  When much is at stake for the ingroup (i.e., after a severe moral 
transgression), childrenÕs behavior is more likely to be guided by loyalty.   
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The whistleblowerÕs dilemma in young children: When loyalty trumps other 
moral concerns 
 
 During recent years, high profile cases of whistleblowing have garnered 
enormous public attention and caused controversy in politics and the international 
media.  For example, recently, the former CIA contractor Edward Snowden, who 
revealed top-secret information about surveillance programs run by the US National 
Security Agency, was extensively both reviled and lauded in equal measure for being 
a whistleblower.  Whistleblowing is the disclosure of oneÕs own groupÕs 
transgressions with the intention of stopping the groupÕs wrongdoing, which 
necessarily involves an act of disloyalty against the group (see Jubb, 1999).  
Whistleblowers  thus experience a dilemma in which they have to decide whether to 
act on their feelings of group loyalty or on other moral principles (Waytz, Dungan, & 
Young, 2013).  According to Haidt and colleagues, loyalty is one of five moral 
foundations (Haidt & Joseph, 2007) and requires preferential treatment for members 
of oneÕs own group.  In contrast, other moral concerns, such as fairness and care, 
demand equal treatment for all (Haidt & Graham, 2007).  Thus, loyalty can involve 
sacrificing other moral principles to protect the group, while whistleblowing involves 
privileging these other moral concerns over loyalty.  The consequences of 
whistleblowing for both the group and the whistleblower can often be severe.  The 
group may be punished externally, and the whistleblower may be punished by the 
group as a traitor, and maybe even excluded or banned.  
 
 Surprisingly, the conditions under which people decide whether to blow the 
whistle on their group have not been extensively investigated.  Research with adults 
has examined the effects of factors such as the interests of the group and role 
responsibility (Trevino & Victor, 1992), or monetary incentives and legal protections 
(Oh & Teo, 2010).  Other studies have focused on whistleblowing in interpersonal 
rather than group contexts (e.g., Bocchiaro, Zimbardo, & Van Lange, 2012; Gino & 
Bazerman, 2009; Waytz et al., 2013).  Only a small amount of research has directly 
investigated the effects of morality and loyalty concerns on whistleblowing.  A set of 
studies conducted by Waytz and colleagues (2013) suggests that participantsÕ 
willingness to blow the whistle on another person is predicted by their endorsement of 
fairness over loyalty concerns.  They also found that participantsÕ willingness to blow 
the whistle decreases with closeness between the participant and the transgressor.  It 
is not yet clear, however, what happens when loyalty and other moral concerns are 
directly pitted against each other in a group context.  Furthermore, a common feature 
of previous research is that it has assessed participantsÕ predictions of how they might 
act if faced with this dilemma. But evidence suggests that participantsÕ predictions 
can diverge from their actual behavior.  For example, in a study conducted by 
Bocchiaro and colleagues (2012), a large majority of participants predicted that they 
would blow the whistle on an unethical request, but only a small minority actually did 
so when put to the test, stressing the importance of investigating the whistleblowing 
dilemma in a behavioral set-up.   
  
Developmental research has shown that both components of the whistleblowerÕs 
dilemma, feelings of group loyalty and other moral concerns, are present early in 
childhood.  At least by 5 years of age, children clearly value loyalty to the group:  
They favor loyal over disloyal group members (e.g., Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 
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2003; Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2008; Misch, Over, & Carpenter, 2014).  
They also show loyal behavior themselves, even when it is costly for them to do so 
(Misch, Over, & Carpenter, 2016).  Young children are also sensitive to other basic 
moral principles.  For example, from the age of 3 years, children actively intervene in 
moral transgressions in which a third party has been harmed (Rossano, Rakoczy, & 
Tomasello, 2011; Vaish, Missana, & Tomasello, 2011), give more resources to an 
individual who behaved in a morally good way (Kenward & Dahl, 2011), and avoid 
helping people with harmful intentions (Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010).  They 
are also concerned with fairness, for example they prefer a fair to an unfair distributor 
in a third party context (e.g., Shaw, DeScioli, & Olson, 2012).   
 
However, to our knowledge, no study has directly investigated the conflict 
between loyalty and other moral considerations in an intergroup context in young 
children.  The few studies that have investigated the related issue of the interplay 
between ingroup favoritism1 and fairness in children have found mixed results.   
DeJesus, Rhodes, and Kinzler (2014) found that in a third-party context, at least from 
6 years of age, children expect others to favor their ingroup, but evaluate fair 
distributions as nicer.  However, when evaluating their own ingroup membersÕ 
resource distributions between groups, Cooley and Killen (2015) found that 3.5- to 6-
year-old children value fairness over group considerations, whereas Jordan, 
McAuliffe, and Warneken (2014) found that 6- and 8-year-old children tended to 
decide whether to punish unfair distributors based on group membership, and in doing 
so, sacrificed moral considerations that demand equal treatment for all (Rhodes & 
Chalik, 2013).   
 
The studies that have come closest to investigating the conflict between loyalty 
and other moral concerns are studies on so-called Òblue liesÓ Ð the opposite of 
whistleblowing Ð that is, lies that are told to protect someone else.  Several studies 
have investigated childrenÕs evaluations of blue lies in story vignettes and found that 
with age, children evaluate blue lies to cover up the ingroupÕs transgression more 
positively (e.g., Chiu Loke, Heyman, Itakura, Toriyama, & Lee, 2014; Fu, Luo, 
Heyman, Wang, Cameron, Lee, 2016; Lau, Cameron, Chieh, OÕLeary, Fu, & Lee, 
2013; Sweet, Heyman, Fu, & Lee, 2010).  To our knowledge, only one behavioral 
study has directly focused on childrenÕs blue lies by asking participants to report their 
own groupÕs wrongdoing.  Fu, Evans, Wang, and Lee (2008) tempted class groups of 
7- to 11-year-old Chinese children to cheat in a competition by allocating more expert 
players to their team than were allowed.  Afterwards, an uninvolved experimenter 
asked children in a confidential one-to-one situation whether their team really played 
by the rules.  The majority of children confessed their teamÕs transgression and thus 
acted according to their moral considerations rather than their feelings of loyalty.  
However, this study did not include an outgroup comparison so it is not known 
whether children would have been even less likely to lie for an outgroup.  It thus still 
remains open how children would weigh moral and loyalty concerns when deciding 
what to do about an ingroup versus an outgroup memberÕs transgression.  
 
                                               
1 Note that loyalty to the group is more than simple ingroup preference, in that it entails a 
sense of commitment and often the willingness to sacrifice personal benefits for the sake of 
the group (see Brewer & Silver, 2000, p. 162).  
2 For 21 of these excluded children it was still possible to obtain a tattling score.  Adding them to the 
THE WHISTLEBLOWERÕS DILEMMA IN YOUNG CHILDREN  
 
5 
A promising approach to study this conflict is to look at childrenÕs tattling 
behavior.  The terms tattling and whistleblowing are often used interchangeably (see 
e.g., Waytz et al., 2013), but one important distinction will be made here:  While 
tattling can be used rather generally and independently of group membership or 
affiliations (see e.g., Ingram & Bering, 2010), whistleblowing refers specifically to 
tattling about oneÕs own organization or group (e.g., Jubb, 1999).  For children, 
tattling is a frequent and natural way of dealing with othersÕ transgressions and 
misbehavior.  Young children do not perceive tattling as negative and thus frequently 
tattle on peers in school (Ingram & Bering, 2010), on their siblings (Den Bak & Ross, 
1996), on puppets in experimental settings (Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012; 
Vaish et al., 2011), and even on adultsÕ transgressions (Heyman, Chiu Loke, & Lee, 
2016).   
 
To investigate the origins of the whistleblowerÕs dilemma in young children, we 
thus study childrenÕs tattling behavior.  Children observed either ingroup or outgroup 
members commit a moral transgression.  Afterwards, an uninvolved experimenter 
entered the room and gave children the chance to spontaneously tattle before asking 
more direct questions. We expected that children would be more likely to tattle on the 
outgroupÕs than on the ingroupÕs transgression, because previous developmental 
research has shown that young children are loyal to their groups (Misch et al., 2016) 
and research with adults has shown that the closeness of oneÕs relationship to the 
transgressor is negatively correlated with the likeliness to blow the whistle on him/her 
(Waytz et al., 2013).  We chose to test 5-year-old children because this is the earliest 
age at which clear evidence exists that children both value loyalty to the group (Misch 
et al., 2014, 2016) and are concerned about moral transgressions (Blake & Harris, 
2009; Rossano et al., 2011; Vaish et al., 2011).   
 
Additionally, to investigate the conflict between loyalty and morality more 
deeply, we were also interested in the impact of the severity of the transgression.  
More specifically, we wished to examine whether and how loyalty and the severity of 
the moral violations would interact.  Results from previous studies looking at 
childrenÕs evaluations of and reactions to different types of transgressions are mixed.  
One line of research has found that 4- to 7-year-old children endorse tattling on both 
major and minor transgressions equally, and only from around 8-9 years endorse 
tattling on major more than on minor transgressions (Chiu Loke, Heyman, Forgie, 
McCarthy, & Lee, 2011; Chiu Loke et al., 2014; Heyman, Chiu Loke, & Lee, 2016; 
Lyon, Ahern, Malloy, & Quas, 2010).  However, in these studies children were 
simply asked to evaluate or predict vignette story charactersÕ tattling behavior.  
Behavioral studies that have investigated childrenÕs own behavior following different 
types of transgressions have found that by 3 years of age, children differentiate 
between severe moral transgressions and more minor conventional violations in that 
they protest more strongly when someone destroys the possession of another person 
compared to when someone plays a game incorrectly (Schmidt et al., 2012).   
 
In the current study, the transgression was implemented in the form of a theft. 
Previous research has shown that from around 3 years of age, children understand the 
violation of property rights and protest against this (Rossano et al., 2011).  At least by 
age 5, they understand the illegitimate nature of stealing (Blake & Harris, 2009).  An 
advantage of using this type of transgression is that it allowed for a quantitative 
manipulation of severity:  Children in the mild transgression condition observed two 
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puppets take only a little bit of someoneÕs possession (i.e., 1 out of 10 gemstones), 
while children in the severe transgression condition observed these puppets take 
nearly all of that resource (i.e., 9 out of 10 gemstones).  For children for whom these 
two puppets were outgroup members (outgroup condition) we expected generally 
high levels of tattling in both transgression conditions (although they might tattle 
more in the severe transgression condition).  Children should not feel any loyalty to 
the outgroup members, and therefore should act according to their moral 
considerations and, consequently, tattle.  For children for whom the transgressors 
were ingroup members (ingroup condition), observing the mild versus severe 
transgression should also elicit mild versus severe moral considerations; however in 
this case these considerations should conflict with loyalty considerations.  We 
expected that childrenÕs feelings of group loyalty would make it more difficult for 
them to blow the whistle on their ingroup members.  There were two different 
possible ways in which the severity of the transgression might influence their 
behavior. 
 
The first possibility was that in the mild condition, compared to their feelings 
of loyalty, childrenÕs moral considerations should be relatively low, and consequently 
children might act according to their feelings of loyalty and keep quiet about their 
groupÕs transgression.  After the severe transgression, however, moral considerations 
should outweigh feelings of loyalty, and thus children might act on their moral 
considerations and blow the whistle on their group.   
 
The social psychological literature with adults suggests a second possibility.   
According to a nonabandonment norm, group members should stick to their group in 
all circumstances (Zdaniuk & Levine, 2001), but especially in situations in which it is 
needed most (e.g., because the group is under threat; see Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 
2002; Van Vugt & Hart, 2004).  Indeed, some evidence supports the notion that threat 
to the group increases group cohesion or ingroup bias (Hunter et al., 2005; Turner, 
Hogg, Turner, & Smith, 1984), and that after undergoing negative experiences, group 
members feel more fused with each other (e.g., Jong, Whitehouse, Kavanagh, & Lane, 
2015) and show more pro-group behavior (Swann et al., 2014).  If this is the case, 
then children should keep quiet after their own groupÕs severe transgression, as 
otherwise the group members would have to face punishment or other negative 
consequences.  After a mild transgression, in contrast, potential negative 
consequences should be relatively minor and not harm the ingroup much; therefore 
children could act according to their moral considerations and blow the whistle.  
 
 
Method 
Participants  
 Participants were 96 five-year-old children (48 girls and 48 boys, age range 
5;0;27 - 5;9;09, M = 5 years, 6 months).  The number of participants (24 per 
condition) was specified in advance based on previous research (Misch et al., 2016).  
Twenty-two additional children were tested but excluded for failing one of the critical 
control questions that tested whether they understood the procedure (i.e., failing to 
correctly say which group they were in [1], failing to correctly say which group the 
transgressors were in [4], or failing to remember whether one vs. many gemstones 
were taken away [8]), or for experimenter error (5), not responding at all (1), leaving 
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the room during the procedure (2), or naming one of the transgressors after herself 
(1).2  
 
 Children were recruited and tested in their daycare centers in a mid-sized city 
in Germany.  The test session took approximately 20 minutes.  No SES or ethnicity 
data were collected, but approximately 98% of the population from which the sample 
was drawn are native German.  The study was developed and conducted in 
accordance with ethical guidelines and was approved by the institutionÕs ethics 
committee (Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology Child Subjects 
Committee). 
 
Materials  
 We used puppets as in- and outgroup members because previous work has 
shown that children are willing to tattle on puppetsÕ transgressions (e.g., Vaish et al., 
2011).  Children were tested by three female experimenters:  a moderator (M) and two 
puppeteers (E1 and E2).  Each puppeteer played one female and one male hand 
puppet (see Figure 1).  The two puppets played by E1 were the transgressors.  In the 
ingroup condition the child was allocated to the same group as the transgressors; in 
the outgroup condition the child was allocated to the other group.   
 
 A set of green and yellow scarves (two puppet-sized scarves and a child-sized 
scarf in each color; see Figure 1) were stored in a box with a lid.  Ten fake red 
gemstones were used as spoils (see Figure 2).  They were hidden in a small purse 
located on a box on the left side of the room (approximately 2m away from the door).  
 
 
Figure 1.  The puppets used in this study: a) The transgressors played by E1 (here 
wearing green group markers), b) The puppets played by E2 (here wearing yellow 
group markers).   
 
 
 There was a low cardboard barrier (30cm in height) on the other side of the 
room.  Thirty large marbles and a marble bag were used to keep children occupied 
and in place before and during the transgression, and a marble run was used for the 
preference test at the end. 
 
                                               
2 For 21 of these excluded children it was still possible to obtain a tattling score.  Adding them to the 
main analysis did not change the results (full-null model comparison: χ2(3) = 8.04, p = .045;  
interaction between group membership and transgression type: Estimate = 2.84, SE = 1.14, χ2(1) = 7.08, 
p < .01).   
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Figure 2.  The ten gemstones used as spoils. 
 
 
Design and Counterbalancing 
 Children were tested in a 2x2 between-subjects design.  We manipulated the 
transgressorsÕ group membership and the transgression type:  Transgressors were 
either in the childÕs in- or outgroup, and took either a little (only one out of 10 
gemstones in the mild condition) or a lot (nine out of 10 gemstones in the severe 
condition).   
 
 Across children, we counterbalanced the color of the childÕs group (so that 
half of the children in each condition were in the yellow group, and the other half 
were in the green group) and the color of the transgressorsÕ group (so that half of the 
time they were in the yellow group, and half of the time they were in the green 
group).   
  
Procedure  
 Children were picked up from their classroom individually by all three 
experimenters.  At the start of the procedure, there was a brief warm-up phase during 
which children became acquainted with the experimenters and the four puppets that 
would later be allocated to groups.  First, the moderator (M) introduced the child to 
the puppets and then asked the puppets to introduce themselves.  Following this, M 
asked the child and each of the puppets two questions to engage them in a brief 
conversation (e.g., about what they had had for breakfast, or which parent dropped 
them off at the daycare).  This was done in order to make the child feel comfortable in 
the situation and to establish that the puppets should be treated as if they were real 
individuals around the same age as the child. 
 
 Group allocation.  After the warm-up, M allocated the child and the four 
puppets to groups.  She did this by saying, ÒToday, we need two different groups.  We 
will have a yellow group and a green group.  First of all, we need to know which 
group everyone belongs to.Ó  M then picked up the box and explained that in this box 
there were yellow and green scarves, and that she would now pull out one scarf for 
each of them, thereby finding out which group they belonged to.  Then, one by one, 
she allocated each of the puppets and the child into groups by apparently randomly 
THE WHISTLEBLOWERÕS DILEMMA IN YOUNG CHILDREN  
 
9 
drawing yellow and green scarves out of the box and placing them on each 
individualÕs neck.  Group allocation always started with one of the childÕs ingroup 
puppets, then proceeded to an outgroup puppet, then to the child, the other outgroup 
puppet, and finally the other ingroup puppet.   
 
 Transgression.  After the group allocation, M said that next they would need 
the marbles that were lying on the floor behind the low barrier in one corner of the 
room.  She noticed that the marble bag was missing and asked the child to come with 
her to look for the bag outside of the room.  This was an excuse so that E1 and E2 
could leave the room unseen and wait in an adjacent room.  When M and the child 
returned with the marble bag, M pretended to be surprised that the others were 
missing and asked the child to put all the marbles into the bag while she looked for 
the others outside.  The task of putting the marbles into the bag was given to children 
so that they would be occupied with a simple activity on one side of the room, but 
would still be attentive enough to observe the transgression.  While the child was busy 
picking up the marbles, the two puppets played by E1 entered the room.  Depending 
on condition, they were either in the same group as the child (ingroup condition) or in 
the other group (outgroup condition).  They recognized and greeted the child very 
briefly, before turning to each other and ignoring the child.  The male puppet then 
said, ÒLook, there is the purse! Maybe there are gemstones in it again, and we could 
take some again!Ó  To make sure that children understood that the puppets were not 
entitled to take the gemstones, the other puppet was skeptical and pointed out that the 
gemstones did not belong to them.  In order to convey the idea that this was 
something this group did regularly, the first puppet said ÒBut we are members of the 
yellow/green group, and the yellow/green group always does it like that!Ó  The female 
puppet then replied, ÒOk, then letÕs have a look.  But letÕs be quick and quiet, so that 
no one will catch us!Ó  They then opened the purse and admired the gemstones.  
Depending on the condition, they took either one (mild transgression) or nine of the 
ten gemstones (severe transgression).  In the mild condition they said to each other, 
ÒLetÕs take only a little bit, only one gemstone.  There are still many left, certainly no 
one will notice!Ó  In the severe condition they said, ÒLetÕs take a lot of them, nearly 
all the gemstones.  There is still one left, certainly no one will notice!Ó  After they put 
the gemstone(s) into their purse, M called them from the outside, Ò[Transgressor 
puppetsÕ names], where are you?Ó  The puppets replied to M, ÒWe are coming,Ó and 
then said to themselves, ÒLetÕs leave quickly, so that no one will catch us!Ó  Finally, 
before leaving the room, they asked the child to wait inside. 
 
 Tattling opportunity.  Then, M entered the room and gave the child the 
chance to tattle.  In order to assess how quickly and spontaneously children tattled, 
she used a stepwise, ramping-up procedure with a 5-second pause in between each 
step to give children time to tattle.  She first started with very general comments (Step 
0: ÒIÕm backÓ and Step 1: ÒIs everything okay?Ó), and then gave some hints that 
something was amiss while looking at the bag (Step 2: ÒWhat is going on here?Ó and 
Step 3: ÒWhat did I miss?Ó).  She then asked more directly about the bag (Step 4: 
ÒThere is a bag.  Someone must have forgotten it...Ó and Step 5: ÒThe zipper is open.  
Maybe someone took something out?Ó).  In the final step she finally suspected the 
puppets directly (Step 6: ÒI think I just saw [names of transgressor puppets] leave, 
maybe they took something?Ó).  If the child did not respond at all during a given 5-
second response period, or only said something unrelated (e.g., just talked about the 
marbles that they had picked up), M moved on to the next step.  For childrenÕs 
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statements to qualify as tattling, they had to make it clear that someone had taken 
something away (for step 6 it was sufficient if they confirmed MÕs suspicion by 
saying ÒyesÓ).  If children only gave a hint of this, M further encouraged them by 
saying ÒUh huh, tell me!Ó  If children correctly described what had happened but 
failed to name the transgressor(s), M asked ÒAnd who?Ó  Following that, children had 
another 5 seconds until, if needed, M moved on to the next step. To minimize social 
pressure on children, M looked only briefly at them and then continued to inspect the 
scene. Thus, children were free to remain silent. 
 
 Post-test measures and resolution.  To explore the motivation underlying 
childrenÕs behavior, we asked them some post-test questions about their justification 
for and evaluation of the transgression, their judgment of the transgressors, their own 
accountability (only for tattlers), their loyalty, and their group preference.  Because 
these questions were exploratory, we did not push children to answer if they did not 
respond.  As a consequence the number of no answer responses was relatively high 
and the results should be taken with some caution.  Furthermore, grouping children 
depending on their tattling behavior led to small and uneven sample sizes in the 
different cells.  Thus, for most of the measures, statistical analysis was not 
appropriate; therefore we report these results in the supplementary material.  
 
 Memory questions.  After the first set of post-test questions (but before the 
loyalty question), in order to make sure that children had followed and understood the 
procedure, M asked children three memory questions:  ÒWhich group did the two who 
took the stones belong to?Ó, ÒHow many stones did they take, many or just a few?Ó, 
and ÒWhich group do you belong to?Ó 
 
 Resolution of the situation.  After MÕs loyalty question, before the preference 
test, the two transgressor puppets re-entered the room.  They were clearly upset by 
their wrongdoing, confessed everything to M, and apologized.  M explained that 
taking away othersÕ belongings is not okay and made them promise never to do 
anything like this again.  Then the other two puppets came back and everyone played 
together with a marble run.  Finally, children were thanked and taken back to their 
classroom.   
   
 
Coding and Reliability  
Our main interest was in whether children tattled on the puppetsÕ transgression 
or not (saying, e.g., ÒThey took the gemstonesÓ or ÒI saw that they stole somethingÓ).  
ChildrenÕs statements were coded as tattling if they made it clear that someone (e.g., 
ÒtheyÓ, Òthe puppetsÓ, Òthe twoÓ, or using their names) had taken something away 
(e.g., ÒThey took somethingÓ, ÒThey swiped the stonesÓ). Only for Step 6 was it 
sufficient if they clearly confirmed MÕs suspicion by saying ÒyesÓ).  
In addition, for those children who tattled, we also investigated how quickly 
and spontaneously they tattled.  For this analysis, children received a score between 0 
and 7, corresponding to the step at which they tattled (e.g., they received 1 if they 
tattled at step 1, or 6 if they tattled at step 6).  If they tattled before MÕs first hint, they 
received a 0, and if they did not tattle at all, they received a score of 7.   
The main coding was done by the first author.  To assess inter-rater reliability, 
an independent coder who was unaware of the hypotheses of the study coded a 
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random sample of 25% of children for both measures together from the videos.  
Reliability (CohenÕs weighted kappa) was perfect with κ = 1.00.  
 
Results 
 All statistical analyses were performed using R (R Core Team, 2014) version 
3.2.0.  Significance of the models was tested using both likelihood ratio tests (LRT), 
by comparing the fit of the full model with that of the respective reduced models, and 
the p values provided by the final model.   
  
 A preliminary analysis revealed no effects of childrenÕs gender or color group 
on the main results regarding childrenÕs tattling (General Linear Model, full-null 
model comparison, p > .25).  Therefore, we collapsed across these variables and do 
not consider them further.   
 
 Our main interest was in how many children tattled about the puppetsÕ 
transgression at any point during the test phase.  Overall, across all four conditions, 
the majority of children tattled (82.3%), suggesting a general concern for harm.  
Figure 3 depicts the percentage of children who tattled in each condition for each 
transgression type.   
 
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of children who tattled, by group membership and transgression 
type, with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.  
 
A GLM was run with group membership and transgression type as predictors, 
and the binomial measure of tattling (yes or no) as response variable.  The full model 
differed significantly from the null model (χ2(3) = 8.14, p = .043) and revealed a 
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significant interaction between group membership and transgression type (Estimate = 
3.05, SE = 1.36, χ2(1) = 6.26, p = .012, NagelkerkeÕs R2 = .11).  Post-hoc tests 
revealed that children in the ingroup condition were significantly less likely to tattle 
on a severe transgression than were children in the outgroup condition (FisherÕs exact 
test, p = .023, risk ratio = 2.17); all other pairwise comparisons were non-significant 
(FisherÕs exact tests, all pÕs > .16). 
 
To investigate whether the conditions had an effect on how quickly children 
tattled, we ran a GLM with Poisson distribution only on children who had tattled at 
some point (n = 79), with childrenÕs tattling score (0 - 6) as the response variable.  
The full model did not differ from the null model (p = .21), indicating that the 
conditions had no significant effect on how quickly children tattled (see Figure 4). 
  
 
 
Figure 4.  Number of children who tattled at each step, by condition. 
 
Discussion 
 The aim of this study was to examine the whistleblowerÕs dilemma:  the 
conflict between feelings of loyalty and other moral concerns.  This was done by 
looking at childrenÕs willingness to blow the whistle on their in- versus outgroup 
membersÕ mild versus severe transgression.  An interesting pattern of results 
emerged:  Rather than simply tattling more on outgroup members across the board, 
children showed a complex weighting of loyalty and moral considerations.  After the 
mild transgression, children acted on their moral considerations:  They tattled on both 
groups at equally high rates.  After the severe transgression, however, they were 
significantly less likely to blow the whistle on their ingroup than on the outgroup, 
suggesting that childrenÕs feelings of loyalty to the group sometimes outweighed 
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other moral considerations.  Consistent with the idea of a nonabandonment norm, 
these results support the notion that group loyalty becomes most important when 
much is at stake for the group, that is, that one should show the strongest loyalty when 
the group is under threat (Ellemers et al., 2002; Van Vugt & Hart, 2004).  These 
results therefore suggest that young children are already capable of flexibly weighing 
moral and loyalty considerations and, in some cases, are willing to sacrifice their 
moral principles for the sake of their group.   
 
There are a number of possible motivations that could have been underlying 
childrenÕs loyal behavior.  We aimed to investigate these with the questions we asked 
children following the tattling phase.   Unfortunately, these findings were 
underpowered due to low response rates (see supplementary materials).  Still, some of 
our and othersÕ findings can shed light on the possible underlying motivations.  For 
example, it is possible that children generally perceive transgressions of their ingroup 
members as less severe than transgressions of their outgroup members and that this 
led them to blow the whistle less often in the ingroup condition.  Previous research 
has shown that children are more forgiving and forgetful when it comes to the 
negative behavior of their ingroup members (Corenblum, 2003; Dunham et al., 2011). 
However, in the mild condition of the current study children were equally likely to 
blow the whistle on their in- and outgroup members, suggesting that this factor alone 
cannot explain the observed results.  Another possibility is that children might have 
wanted to protect their ingroup from the potential negative consequences (e.g., 
punishment) of their whistleblowing and/or avoid being punished themselves. 
Previous work has shown that children feel responsible for their group membersÕ 
negative actions (Over, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2016), and consequently childrenÕs 
feelings of shame or embarrassment about their group membersÕ transgression might 
have decreased their whistleblowing in the ingroup severe condition.  Relatedly, some 
children might have been shocked about their groupÕs transgression and thus too 
preoccupied to speak out about it.  Future research should thus investigate the role of 
moral emotions such as guilt and embarrassment, and also the fear of negative 
consequences in the context of loyal behavior.  Another potential reason for childrenÕs 
increased loyalty after the severe transgression is the fact that the group was now in 
possession of the stolen goods.  Previous research has shown that children prefer 
wealthy over less wealthy groups (Horwitz, Shutts, & Olson, 2014) and show more 
loyalty to groups that are of high status (e.g., Nesdale & Flesser, 2001).  However, 
childrenÕs justifications for why they wanted to stay in or leave their group suggest 
that this was not the reason for their choice in this situation:  No child ever justified 
their choice to stay with or join the transgressorsÕ group by mentioning the groupÕs 
wealth, higher status, or the possession of the stones more generally, while the 
transgression was a common reason for joining or not leaving the non-transgressorsÕ 
group.   
 
In future research, it would be informative to investigate in which situations 
children are willing to override their moral concerns in order to remain loyal.  It 
would be interesting to look at childrenÕs loyalty after even more different types of 
transgressions, including a wider range of severity and different kinds of moral 
violations.  Also, if children were asked to choose between internal within-group 
protest (i.e., scolding and correcting ingroup members privately) and external tattling 
(i.e., telling someone outside the group more publicly), would their choice depend on 
their group membership?   
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In summary, our findings suggest that both loyalty and other moral 
considerations guide 5-year-old childrenÕs behavior.  When moral concerns are 
relatively low, children act freely on them by tattling on the outgroup and even 
blowing the whistle on their own group.  In contrast, when moral concerns increase, 
childrenÕs behavior is guided by their loyalty: They tattle freely on their outgroup, but 
are less likely to blow the whistle on their own group.  Thus, already by 5 years of 
age, children consider both loyalty and other moral concerns together, and adapt their 
behavior flexibly.  Even though they clearly understood the negative nature of the 
transgression, they were willing to sacrifice their personal moral concerns for the sake 
of their group.  This is an interesting finding, given the fact that from very early on, 
children show a strong appreciation for key moral domains such as care and fairness 
(e.g., Hamlin & Wynn, 2011; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Vaish et al., 2011), 
while robust preferences for minimal ingroups and clear loyal behavior do not appear 
much before the age of five (Dunham et al., 2011; Misch et al., 2016).  Thus, right 
around the time that loyalty to the group first appears in ontogeny, it can already have 
a dark side, overriding other moral concerns.  This can lead to rather undesirable 
behavior on the one hand, for example when it results in concealing moral 
transgressions of the ingroup.  However, from the perspective of the group, it may be 
seen as desirable in that it helps ensure from early on that group members are 
trustworthy and protective of their group and thus that they can be counted on when 
most needed.   
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Supplementary Materials 
 
Procedure 
 
 To help understand the motivations behind childrenÕs responses, we asked 
children some exploratory questions after the main test phase.  To ensure that all 
children felt comfortable talking about the transgression, at this point M confirmed 
her suspicion that the two transgressors took something, expressed at Step 6, by 
saying aloud to herself, ÒThat is what must have happened.Ó 
 
 Transgression justification.  To see whether children would come up with 
excuses for the transgressors and, if so, to check whether the excuses would differ 
between conditions, children were asked why they thought the puppets took the 
gemstones.   
 
 Judgments.  Then, to see whether children understood the transgression as 
morally wrong, and to examine whether they would judge this differently between 
conditions, M asked them to judge the severity of transgression, asking, ÒDo you 
think what they did was good, okay, not so good, or bad?Ó and ÒWhy do you think 
this was [childrenÕs response]?Ó  
 
 Punishment.  After that, to see whether children thought there should be 
consequences for the transgression, and whether their perception of these would differ 
between conditions, children were asked, ÒWhat should we do with them when they 
come back?Ó and ÒShould they be punished?Ó  If children responded with ÒyesÓ to the 
latter question, they were then asked, ÒHow should they be punished?Ó  
 
 Accountability.  To see whether children were aware that tattling might have 
negative consequences for themselves if the transgressors found out that children had 
tattled, all children who had tattled were asked, ÒWould it be ok if they [the 
transgressors] knew that you told me about this?Ó  
 
 Exit choice and exit choice justification.  After that, children were given a 
chance to leave their group:  M discovered one additional group marker from the 
childÕs outgroup, and asked children whether they wanted to change groups or wanted 
to stay in their group, and why they decided to stay or leave.  
 
 Preference test.  All four puppets, the child, and M sat together around the 
marble run for a final preference test.  The child was given the first marble to put 
down the marble run.  Then, M asked the child to distribute four more marbles, one 
by one, to the puppets.   
 After that, all the puppets and the child engaged in free play with the marble 
run. 
 
Coding and Reliability 
Along with exploring childrenÕs responses to the post-test questions, we also 
took a closer look at childrenÕs tattling responses.  For the post-test questions, if 
children did not respond, shrugged, replied with ÒI donÕt know,Ó or gave a response 
that was unrelated to the question, their answer was coded as no answer.  Children 
were not prompted again in these cases, as these questions only aimed at providing 
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additional information. An independent, nave coder coded a random sample of 25% 
of childrenÕs transcribed responses.  
 
Tattling words.  First, we looked at what words children used when tattling 
about the puppetsÕ transgression.  We were interested in whether children would use 
neutral vs. more negative words when tattling, as this could reflect their evaluation of 
the severity of the transgression.  Thus, for all the children who tattled, we 
categorized the terms they used into neutral words, which described the event without 
evaluating it (e.g., Òleaving only one,Ó Òtaking out,Ó Òputting into her pocketÓ) and 
more negative words (e.g., Òstealing,Ó Òtaking away,Ó ÒswipingÓ).  Reliability 
(CohenÕs weighted kappa) was good with κ = 0.69. 
 
Transgression justifications.  After the main test, the moderator asked 
children why they thought the puppets had taken the gemstones.  To investigate 
whether children would downplay vs. emphasize the transgression, their responses 
were coded as positive/mitigating (e.g., Òbecause the stones were so pretty,Ó Òthe 
stones were just lying around,Ó Òthey were just curiousÓ), negative/aggravating (e.g., 
Òbecause they wanted to steal them,Ó Òbecause they are thievesÓ), and neutral/other 
(e.g., Òthey wanted to,Ó Òbecause they are in the yellow groupÓ).  Reliability was 
excellent with κ = 1.    
 
Judgments and judgment justifications.  ChildrenÕs judgments of the 
puppetsÕ transgression were coded as scores on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (ÒgoodÓ) 
to 4 (ÒbadÓ).  Children were also asked to justify their judgments.  These justifications 
were coded into categories referring to moral (focusing on the harm that was done, 
e.g., Ònow only one is left,Ó Òif it belongs to someone, he will be sad when he 
returnsÓ), normative (referring to norms, rules, permission, and ownership rights, e.g., 
Òone shouldnÕt do this,Ó Òthey didnÕt askÓ), and other reasons (e.g., Òbecause they 
were red,Ó ÒI didnÕt think they would do itÓ).  Reliability was excellent for childrenÕs 
judgments (CohenÕs weighted kappa) with κ = .94, and fair for childrenÕs judgment 
justifications (CohenÕs kappa) with κ = 56. 
 
Punishment.  We coded whether children thought that the transgressors 
should be punished (ÒyesÓ) or not (ÒnoÓ), and, if so, what kind of punishment they 
proposed in response to the other two questions (i.e., ÒWhat should we do with 
them?Ó and ÒHow should they be punished?Ó).  Since there was considerable overlap 
between childrenÕs responses to these similar questions, we combined their responses 
to these questions and, if they differed, counted the most severe form of punishment 
they suggested.  Response categories were lecturing (verbal forms of punishment and 
lecturing, e.g., Òscold them,Ó Òtell them that this is not okayÓ), compensate (requests 
to return the spoils, e.g., Òthey have to give the stones backÓ), or penalty (responses 
involving every other kind of non-verbal punishment, e.g., Òsend them to prison,Ó 
Òban on watching TV,Ó Òcatch them with a trapÓ).  Reliability (CohenÕs kappa) for all 
these measures together was excellent with κ = .91.    
 
Accountability.  We coded whether children thought that it would be okay if 
the transgressors knew about their tattling (ÒyesÓ) or not okay (ÒnoÓ).  Reliability 
(CohenÕs kappa) was excellent with κ = 1. 
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Exit choice and justification.  For the exit choice, we assessed whether 
children wanted to leave their group or not (ÒyesÓ or ÒnoÓ), and what reasons they 
gave for their choice.  For their reasons, we coded the following categories: 
transgression (when children referred to the transgression, e.g., Òbecause they took 
the gemstones,Ó Òbecause they didnÕt stealÓ), policing (when children wanted to stay 
in their group as a guard, e.g., Òbecause I can tell you if they do something wrong,Ó ÒI 
want to make sure that they will not steal againÓ), group preference (when children 
indicated that they identified with the group or preferred the group members in 
question, e.g., ÒI like the green group,Ó Òbecause I want to play with themÓ), color 
preference (when children referred to the groupÕs color, e.g., Òbecause green is my 
favorite color,Ó ÒI like the yellow scarf betterÓ), or other (any other statement that did 
not fall into one of the categories above, e.g., Òbecause I want toÓ).  Reliability 
(CohenÕs kappa) was excellent with κ = .91. 
 
Preference test.  We assessed which puppet children gave the first marble to 
in the marble run game.  If children gave this marble to one of their ingroup members, 
this was counted as preferring the ingroup, and if children gave this marble to one of 
the outgroup members, this was counted as preferring the outgroup.  For children who 
had indicated that they wanted to change groups, we coded their preference according 
to their original group membership, i.e., the one they were allocated to at the 
beginning of the procedure.  Reliability (CohenÕs weighted kappa) was excellent with 
κ = .92.   
 
 
Results 
 We did not push children to answer if they did not respond to the exploratory 
post-test questions.  As a consequence the number of no answer responses was 
relatively high and the results should be taken with some caution.  Thus, for most of 
the measures, statistical analysis was not appropriate due to small and uneven sample 
sizes in the different cells.  In these cases we only report descriptive results. 
  
 Tattling words.  We investigated whether children who tattled at some point 
(n = 79) used more negative words when tattling about the outgroupÕs transgression 
and/or the severe transgression.  Table 1 shows the percentage of children who used 
each type of utterance in each condition.  A Poisson-distributed GLM was run with 
group membership and transgression type as predictors.  The full model did not differ 
from the null model (p = .213), indicating that there were no significant differences 
between conditions. 
 
 Transgression justifications.  In response to the question about why the 
puppets had taken away the gemstones, childrenÕs relevant responses were mostly 
positive/mitigating (26%) or neutral responses (19%) overall.  Table 1 shows the 
percentage of children who gave each response type in each condition.  Any 
differences between conditions are difficult to interpret because of the small number 
of children who gave answers:  overall, 50% of children did not answer this question. 
 
 Judgments and judgment justifications.  Most children judged the 
transgression as either Ònot so goodÓ or Òbad.Ó Only two children (both in the ingroup 
mild condition) judged the transgression as ÒgoodÓ or ÒokÓ.  A Poisson-distributed 
GLM was run with group membership and transgression type as predictors for 
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childrenÕs judgment score, but the full model did not differ from the null model (p > 
.25).  Of the children who judged the transgression as being negative (i.e., either Ònot 
so goodÓ or ÒbadÓ; all but two of the children), overall, 49% justified their responses 
with normative and 30% with moral reasons (see Table 1 for the justifications in each 
condition). 
 
 Punishment.  Overall, 56% of children thought that the transgressors should 
be punished.  Fourteen percent of all children suggested lecturing or scolding the 
transgressors verbally, 19% suggested that the transgressors be made to return the 
stones, and 25% proposed some sort of penalty.  Strikingly, penalty, the most severe 
form of punishment, was rarely seen in the ingroup mild condition.  Statistically there 
was no difference between conditions; the full-null GLM comparison was not 
significant (p > .25).  However, again, because of high rates of no answer responses, 
this analysis should be interpreted with caution.  Percentages for each condition are 
displayed in Table 1.   
 
 Accountability.  Of the 79 children who tattled at some point, overall, 58% 
did not want the transgressors to know about their tattling, while 22% said it would be 
okay (20% gave no answer).  Very few children in the ingroup mild condition wanted 
the transgressors to know about their tattling (see Table 1).  However, statistically this 
difference between conditions was only marginal:  The null model differed only 
marginally from the full model (χ2(3) = 6.57, p = .087).  The full model revealed a 
marginal interaction effect (Estimate = -2.46, SE = 1.39, χ2(1) = 3.67 , p = .055, 
NagelkerkeÕs R2 = .08).  Pairwise comparisons revealed marginal differences between 
the ingroup mild condition and all other conditions (FisherÕs exact tests:  p = .067, 
risk ratio = 6.07 with the ingroup severe condition; p = .085, risk ratio = 6 with the 
outgroup mild condition, and p = .085, risk ratio = 0.88 with outgroup severe 
condition).     
 
 Exit choice and exit choice justifications.  When childrenÕs ingroup 
members were the transgressors, 46% of children wanted to leave their group after the 
mild transgression, but only 25% after the severe transgression. When the 
transgressors were outgroup members, 17% wanted to leave their group (and join the 
transgressor group) after the mild transgression, and 8% after the severe transgression  
(Table 1). Because childrenÕs tattling behavior might have influenced childrenÕs wish 
to change groups, we first tested whether childrenÕs exit choice was influenced by 
their tattling (yes/no), but found no relation between tattling and childrenÕs exit 
choice, GLM full vs. null model, p >.25).  Then, a GLM was run to analyze the effect 
of condition on childrenÕs exit choice.  The full model differed significantly from the 
null model (χ2(3) = 10.22,  p = .017) and revealed no interaction between group 
membership and transgression type (p > .25).  A main effect of group membership 
was found (Estimate = 1.39, SE = .54, z = 2.57, p = .0091, NagelkerkeÕs R2 = .11), as 
well as a marginal main effect of transgression type (p = .08).  Thus, children were 
more likely to leave their group when their group members had transgressed, and 
marginally less likely to leave their group after a severe transgression.  
 
 Overall, most children justified their response with their color preference 
(26%), a group preference (21%), the transgression (18%) or other reasons (19%).  
Only four percent of children justified their response with policing.  Table 2 shows 
the percentage of childrenÕs reasons by condition.  The transgression type did not 
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seem to have a big impact on childrenÕs justification.  We additionally looked at the 
data clustered in the following way:  First, we were interested in what reasons 
children gave for not wanting to be a member of the transgressorsÕ group, that is, why 
children in the ingroup condition wanted to leave the transgressorsÕ group (n = 17), 
and why children in the outgroup condition did not want to join the transgressorsÕ 
group (n = 42).  Taken together, 29% of these children justified their decision with the 
transgression they had observed.  Other common reasons were color preference 
(22%) and group preference (19%).  Conversely, we were also interested in what 
reasons children gave for wanting to be a member of the transgressorsÕ group, and 
therefore looked at the justifications of children in the ingroup condition who wanted 
to stay in the transgressorsÕ group (n = 31) and children in the outgroup condition 
who wanted to join the transgressorsÕ group (n = 6).  Taken together, these children 
mostly explained their choice with color preference (32%) or group preference 
(24%).  Interestingly, three of the children (8%) who wanted to stay in the 
transgressorsÕ group justified this with policing, indicating that they would like to 
improve their groupÕs behavior from within.   
 
 Preference test.  Finally, we assessed childrenÕs ingroup preference by 
looking at whom they gave the first marble to when they were asked to allocate the 
marbles for the marble run game.  In the ingroup condition, only 46% of children 
preferred their ingroup member in this task, compared to 69% of children in the 
outgroup condition who preferred their ingroup (see Table 1 for percentages by group 
and transgression conditions).  To investigate the effect of condition on childrenÕs 
ingroup preference, we ran a GLM with group membership and transgression type as 
predictors for this binomial measure of ingroup preference.  The null model differed 
only marginally from the full model (χ2(3) = 6.65, p = .084), and the interaction was 
not significant (p > .25).  After removing the interaction from the model (χ2(2) = 6.33, 
p = .042), we found a main effect of group membership (Estimate = 0.97, SE = 0.43, z 
= 2.26, p = .024, NagelkerkeÕs R2 = .07).  Thus, childrenÕs ingroup preference was 
diminished when the transgression was conducted by their ingroup, compared to 
outgroup, members, while the severity of the transgression did not influence 
childrenÕs ingroup preference. 
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Tables 
Table 1  
For the Post-Test Measures, the Percentage of Children Giving each Type of Answer 
in each Group Membership and Transgression Type Condition 
 Ingroup Conditions  Outgroup Conditions 
Measures Mild Severe  Mild Severe 
Tattling Words (n = 79)      
    Negative  48% 69%  74% 61% 
    Neutral 52% 31%  26% 39% 
Transgression Justifications (n = 96)      
    Positive/Mitigating 33% 29%  17% 25% 
    Neutral 29% 13%  17% 17% 
    Negative/Aggravating 0% 4%  13% 4% 
    No answer 38% 54%  54% 54% 
Judgments (n = 96)      
    Good 4% 0%  0% 0% 
    Okay 4% 0%  0% 0% 
    Not so good 46% 46%  38% 29% 
    Bad 46% 42%  58% 67% 
    No answer 0% 13%  4% 5% 
Judgment Justification (n = 94)      
    Moral 23% 21%  33% 42% 
    Norm 50% 54%  58% 33% 
    Other 5% 0%  0% 4% 
    No answer 23% 25%  8% 21% 
Punishment (n = 96)      
    Yes 58% 54%  58% 54% 
    No 29% 29%  21% 21% 
    No answer 13% 17%  21% 25% 
How to punish (n = 96)      
    Lecturing 13% 17%  17% 8% 
    Compensating 29% 8%  13% 25% 
    Penalty 8% 25%  33% 33% 
    No answer 50% 50%  38% 33% 
Accountability (n = 79)      
    Yes 5% 31%  32% 22% 
    No 76% 56%  53% 48% 
    No answer 19% 13%  16% 30% 
Exit Choice (n = 96)      
    Leaving 46% 25%  17% 8% 
Preference Test (n = 96)      
    Ingroup Preference 38% 54%  67% 71% 
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Note.  Justification judgments include only children who judged the transgression as 
negative (i.e., all but two children).   
 
 
 
Table 2 
Reasons Children in Each Group Membership and Transgression Type Condition 
Gave for Changing Groups or Staying in Their Group  
 Ingroup Conditions  Outgroup Conditions 
Reasons Mild Severe  Mild Severe 
Changing (n = 23)      
    Transgression 27% 33%  0% 0% 
    Policing 0% 0%  0% 0% 
    Group Preference 27% 17%  25% 50% 
    Color Preference 27% 17%  50% 50% 
    Other 9% 33%  0% 0% 
    No Answer 9% 0%  25% 0% 
Staying (n = 73)      
    Transgression 0% 0%  25% 32% 
    Policing 15% 6%  5% 0% 
    Group Preference 31% 17%  15% 18% 
    Color Preference 23% 33%  20% 23% 
    Other 23% 28%  20% 14% 
    No Answer 8% 17%  15% 14% 
 
 
